The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013
The United States Government assesses with high confidence that
the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the
Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime
used a nerve agent in the attack. These all-source assessments are based
on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a significant
body of open source reporting.Our classified assessments have been
shared with the U.S. Congress and key international partners. To protect
sources and methods, we cannot publicly release all available
intelligence – but what follows is an unclassified summary of the U.S.
Intelligence Community’s analysis of what took place.
Syrian Government Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21
A large body of independent sources indicates that a chemical weapons
attack took place in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. In addition to
U.S. intelligence information, there are accounts from international and
Syrian medical personnel; videos; witness accounts; thousands of social
media reports from at least 12 different locations in the Damascus
area; journalist accounts; and reports from highly credible
nongovernmental organizations.
A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people
were killed in the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426
children, though this assessment will certainly evolve as we obtain more
information.
We assess with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out
the chemical weapons attack against opposition elements in the Damascus
suburbs on August 21. We assess that the scenario in which the
opposition executed the attack on August 21 is highly unlikely. The body
of information used to make this assessment includes intelligence
pertaining to the regime’s preparations for this attack and its means of
delivery, multiple streams of intelligence about the attack itself and
its effect, our post-attack observations, and the differences between
the capabilities of the regime and the opposition. Our high confidence
assessment is the strongest position that the U.S. Intelligence
Community can take short of confirmation. We will continue to seek
additional information to close gaps in our understanding of what took
place.
Background:
The Syrian regime maintains a stockpile
of numerous chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, and VX and has
thousands of munitions that can be used to deliver chemical warfare
agents.
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is the
ultimate decision maker for the chemical weapons program and members of
the program are carefully vetted to ensure security and loyalty. The
Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) – which is
subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense – manages Syria’s chemical
weapons program.
We assess with high confidence that the Syrian regime has used
chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition multiple times
in the last year, including in the Damascus suburbs. This assessment is
based on multiple streams of information including reporting of Syrian
officials planning and executing chemical weapons attacks and laboratory
analysis of physiological samples obtained from a number of
individuals, which revealed exposure to sarin. We assess that the
opposition has not used chemical weapons.
The Syrian regime has the types of munitions that we assess were used
to carry out the attack on August 21, and has the ability to strike
simultaneously in multiple locations. We have seen no indication that
the opposition has carried out a large-scale, coordinated rocket and
artillery attack like the one that occurred on August 21.
We assess that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons over the
last year primarily to gain the upper hand or break a stalemate in areas
where it has struggled to seize and hold strategically valuable
territory. In this regard, we continue to judge that the Syrian regime
views chemical weapons as one of many tools in its arsenal, including
air power and ballistic missiles, which they indiscriminately use
against the opposition.
The Syrian regime has initiated an effort to rid the Damascus suburbs
of opposition forces using the area as a base to stage attacks against
regime targets in the capital. The regime has failed to clear dozens of
Damascus neighborhoods of opposition elements, including neighborhoods
targeted on August 21, despite employing nearly all of its conventional
weapons systems. We assess that the regime’s frustration with its
inability to secure large portions of Damascus may have contributed to
its decision to use chemical weapons on August 21.
Preparation:
We have intelligence that leads us to assess that Syrian chemical
weapons personnel – including personnel assessed to be associated with
the SSRC – were preparing chemical munitions prior to the attack. In the
three days prior to the attack, we collected streams of human, signals
and geospatial intelligence that reveal regime activities that we assess
were associated with preparations for a chemical weapons attack.
Syrian chemical weapons personnel were operating in the Damascus
suburb of ‘Adra from Sunday, August 18 until early in the morning on
Wednesday, August 21 near an area that the regime uses to mix chemical
weapons, including sarin. On August 21, a Syrian regime element prepared
for a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus area, including through
the utilization of gas masks. Our intelligence sources in the Damascus
area did not detect any indications in the days prior to the attack that
opposition affiliates were planning to use chemical weapons.
The Attack:
Multiple streams of intelligence indicate that the regime executed a
rocket and artillery attack against the Damascus suburbs in the early
hours of August 21. Satellite detections corroborate that attacks from a
regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods where the chemical attacks
reportedly occurred – including Kafr Batna, Jawbar, ‘Ayn Tarma, Darayya,
and Mu’addamiyah. This includes the detection of rocket launches from
regime controlled territory early in the morning, approximately 90
minutes before the first report of a chemical attack appeared in social
media. The lack of flight activity or missile launches also leads us to
conclude that the regime used rockets in the attack.
Local social media reports of a chemical attack in the Damascus
suburbs began at 2:30 a.m. local time on August 21. Within the next four
hours there were thousands of social media reports on this attack from
at least 12 different locations in the Damascus area. Multiple accounts
described chemical-filled rockets impacting opposition-controlled areas.
Three hospitals in the Damascus area received approximately 3,600
patients displaying symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure in
less than three hours on the morning of August 21, according to a highly
credible international humanitarian organization. The reported
symptoms, and the epidemiological pattern of events – characterized by
the massive influx of patients in a short period of time, the origin of
the patients, and the contamination of medical and first aid workers –
were consistent with mass exposure to a nerve agent. We also received
reports from international and Syrian medical personnel on the ground.
We have identified one hundred videos attributed to the attack, many
of which show large numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs
consistent with, but not unique to, nerve agent exposure. The reported
symptoms of victims included unconsciousness, foaming from the nose and
mouth, constricted pupils, rapid heartbeat, and difficulty breathing.
Several of the videos show what appear to be numerous fatalities with no
visible injuries, which is consistent with death from chemical weapons,
and inconsistent with death from small-arms, high-explosive munitions
or blister agents. At least 12 locations are portrayed in the publicly
available videos, and a sampling of those videos confirmed that some
were shot at the general times and locations described in the footage.
We assess the Syrian opposition does not have the capability to
fabricate all of the videos, physical symptoms verified by medical
personnel and NGOs, and other information associated with this chemical
attack.
We have a body of information, including past Syrian practice, that
leads us to conclude that regime officials were witting of and directed
the attack on August 21. We intercepted communications involving a
senior official intimately familiar with the offensive who confirmed
that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August 21 and was
concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On the afternoon
of August 21, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weapons
personnel were directed to cease operations. At the same time, the
regime intensified the artillery barrage targeting many of the
neighborhoods where chemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour period
after the attack, we detected indications of artillery and rocket fire
at a rate approximately four times higher than the ten preceding days.
We continued to see indications of sustained shelling in the
neighborhoods up until the morning of August 26.
To conclude, there is a substantial body of information that
implicates the Syrian government’s responsibility in the chemical
weapons attack that took place on August 21.As indicated, there is
additional intelligence that remains classified because of sources and
methods concerns that is being provided to Congress and international
partners.
