Petros!!!!

How to Leave the Euro!!!!

HAVING been led down an ever-worsening spiral by the euro zone and its own government, Greece now faces two options, both of them painful: stay the course, or default and exit the monetary union.

Each presents difficulties and uncertainties, but in the long run there is no question that default, and a return to the drachma, offer the better chance of economic growth and employment.

Staying the course — which, despite the impending change of government, is still Greece’s plan — means continuing austerity and unemployment for the foreseeable future. The young and skilled will go abroad, leaving behind an older, less productive and needier population to endure a crushing debt. In the meantime, all important economic decisions will be made in Paris, Berlin and Brussels.

Default at Greece’s initiative, by contrast, would allow Greece to influence its destiny. The process would be largely governed by Greek law, instead of its being a matter of private discussions between the German chancellor and the French president, and would thus lead to a more sustainable debt burden.

Because of problems with financing Greek banks and pension funds, default would be likely to mean leaving the euro. But that’s a good thing, as it would give Greece control of its own monetary policy. This is especially important now, with Greek credit and liquidity severely restricted, most critically in its vital small-business sector. Moreover, since the “new drachma,” as the post-euro currency might be called, would depreciate, both tourism and exports would rise, and imports decrease, all of which would make Greece more competitive.

So why have Greek leaders stuck with the euro at all? In part, it’s because the thought of defaulting and leaving the euro after nearly a decade is so intimidating. But while not without costs, it would in fact be relatively straightforward, especially if preparation is underway behind the scenes.

To minimize the number of days banks would need to be closed, the decision to move to the new drachma should be made on a Friday. Bank deposits and domestic debt would be immediately converted to new drachmas at the initial exchange rate. It would fall to the Greek courts to determine whether pre-2010 public debt would follow suit, but there is no reason to think they would treat it any differently from domestic debt.

Loans from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, though, would probably be kept in euros. That’s a problem, because once Greece leaves, the euro itself would substantially increase in value — and thus the loans’ price in drachmas would increase. But since incomes would also drop if the country stayed in the euro zone, the real, productive resources the country would need to service that debt wouldn’t be much different.

Apart from these steps, the transition would take time. It could take perhaps months to print enough new drachmas to support domestic transactions, and during that time euros would stay in circulation. Banks would also need time to adjust their accounting, computers and clearing routines. Still, a few distinctive details of the euro aside, managing the transition from one currency to another is well understood: the change of currencies that followed the breakup of Czechoslovakia, for example, took several weeks and by all accounts went well.

True, such a move would close off access to international bond markets, making bilateral borrowing from another country Greece’s only option abroad. But this is less a concern than some think, because Greece is soon expected to achieve a primary budget surplus (the government budget surplus, excluding interest on debt) which would make domestic borrowing sufficient.

Initially, foreign exchange would be scarce, making it harder to import essential goods. In the short term, then, Greece would need to limit the outflow of foreign capital, an aggressive but not uncommon practice. The private, euro-denominated external debt of banks and other companies would also need support through government guarantees.

Some of these steps may seem daunting, but they are not much different from what Greece faced before its adoption of the euro. In any case, the policies followed so far have demonstrably failed. Greece must contemplate, and then undertake, an exit from the euro zone. The sooner a transition occurs, the better for everyone.

Stergios Skaperdas is a professor of economics at the University of California, Irvine.

Works


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Working papers

  1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Seven Myths about the Greek Debt Crisis," Working Papers 111201, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  2. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Governance and Norms as Determinants of Arming," Working Papers 111203, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  3. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2011. "Trade and Insecure Resources: Implications for Welfare and Comparative Advantage," Working Papers 111201, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  4. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Technologies of Conflict," Working Papers 101111, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  5. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Policymaking in the Eurozone and the Core Vs. Perifphery Problem," Working Papers 101112, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  6. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Proprietary Public Finance: On its Emergence and Evolution out of Anarchy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3495, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2010. "Trade in the Shadow of Power," Working Papers 101105, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
  8. Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence," Working Papers 080924, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  9. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future," Working Papers 080922, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  10. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2009. "International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined," Working Papers 080921, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  11. Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity," Working Papers 091002, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  12. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2008. "Globalization and Insecurity: Reviewing Some Basic Issues," Working Papers 080901, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  13. Jose Luis Evia & Roberto Laserna & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Socio-Political Conflict and Eonomic Performance in Bolivia," Working Papers 070814, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  14. Vimal Kumar & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "On The Economics oF Organized Crime," Working Papers 070815, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  15. Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "An Economic Approach to Analyzing Civil War," Working Papers 060715, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  16. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2007. "Persuasion as a Contest," Working Papers 070809, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  17. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Working Papers 060705, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  18. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
  19. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2005. "Globalization and Domestic Conflict," International Trade 0507005, EconWPA.
  20. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 1636, CESifo Group Munich.
  21. Konrad, Kai A & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2005. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot be Divorced from its Governance," CESifo Working Paper Series 901, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Ramon Castillo & Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "All in the Family or Public? Law and Appropriative Costs as Determinants of Ownership Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series 921, CESifo Group Munich.
  24. Alexander R. W. Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2002. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 762, CESifo Group Munich.
  25. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  26. Genicot, C. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Investing in Confict Management," Papers 00-01-17, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  27. Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Warlord Competition," Papers 00-01-20, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  28. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On The Relationship Between Security and Trade," Papers 00-01-23, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  29. Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Turning 'Citizens' into 'Consumers:' Economic Growth and the Level of Public Discourse," Papers 00-01-18, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  30. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," Papers 99-00-12, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  31. Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms Against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Papers 00-01-19, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  32. Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1999. ""Do Norms Against Threats have Real Effects? Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict"," Papers 98-99-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  33. Skaperdas, S., 1999. "On the Political Economy of Organized Crime Is There Much That Can Be Done?," Papers 99-00-07, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  34. Konrad, Kai A & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1999. "The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State," CEPR Discussion Papers 2173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  35. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1998. "Complementarity in Contests," Papers 97-98-21, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  36. Lee, J. & Skaperdas, S., 1998. "Workshops or Barracks? Productive versus Enforcive Investment and Economic Performance," Papers 97-98-20, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  37. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1996. "Insecure Properties and the Stability of Exchange," Papers 95-96-8, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  38. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Gangs as Primitive States," Papers 92-93-02, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  39. Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Self-Protection and Bankruptcy," Papers 90-92-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  40. Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Coalition Formation as a Contest: Introduction and Application to the Three-Player Case," Papers 90-92-08, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  41. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1991. ""The Shadow of the Future": Can it Harm Cooperation?," Papers 12-91-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  42. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1991. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Directly Unproductive Activities," Papers 12-91-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  43. Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  44. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1991. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Directly Unproductive," Papers 90-92-10, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  45. Skaperdas, S., 1990. "Conflict And Attitudes Toward Risk," Papers 90-91-05, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.

Articles

  1. Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Peace and War With Endogenous State Capacity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 446-468, June.
  2. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Policymaking in the Eurozone and the Core vs Periphery Problem," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(2), pages 12-18, 07.
  3. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, March.
  4. Johannes Münster & Stergios Skaperdas, 2010. "Introduction," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-101, April.
  5. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2008. "Globalization and domestic conflict," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 296-308, December.
  6. Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 109-128, July.
  7. Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "An economic approach to analyzing civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 25-44, January.
  8. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676.
  9. Ramon Castillo & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 93-104, 07.
  10. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, 07.
  11. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  12. Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 1-16, September.
  13. Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
  14. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2001. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 353-357, May.
  15. Konrad, Kai A & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1998. "Extortion," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 461-77, November.
  16. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1998. "Complementarity in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 667-684, November.
  17. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1998. " On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 25-42, July.
  18. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-17, February.
  19. Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1997. "Credible threats in extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 23-39, May.
  20. Kai A.Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 1997. "Backing up Words with Deeds: Information and punishment in organized crime," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 24, pages 51-63.
  21. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 355-372, May.
  22. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 1996. "On the Effects of Insecure Property," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 622-26, April.
  23. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  24. Skaperdas, Stergios & Gan, Li, 1995. "Risk Aversion in Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(431), pages 951-62, July.
  25. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 1993. "Self-Insurance and Self-Protection: A Nonexpected Utility Analysis," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 18(2), pages 131-146, December.
  26. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
  27. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1991. "Conflict and Attitudes toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 116-20, May.

Chapters

  1. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.

Books

  1. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios (ed.), 2012. "The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195392777.
  2. Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 2008. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521088268.
  3. Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521560634.

NEP Fields

29 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-AFR: Africa (3) 2005-08-13 2006-07-21 2006-09-03
  2. NEP-AGR: Agricultural Economics (1) 2011-11-07
  3. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2011-07-13
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2005-10-04
  5. NEP-DEV: Development (2) 2006-01-29 2008-03-08
  6. NEP-EEC: European Economics (1) 2011-11-07
  7. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2004-05-02
  8. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2009-06-03
  9. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2006-10-28 2008-01-05 2009-06-03
  10. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic & Financial History (1) 2007-04-21
  11. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2004-05-02
  12. NEP-INT: International Trade (4) 2005-08-13 2005-08-13 2010-11-13 2011-11-07
  13. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (2) 2005-08-13 2008-03-08
  14. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2005-10-04
  15. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2008-01-05
  16. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2005-10-04 2005-12-09
  17. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (6) 2001-11-21 2005-10-04 2005-10-04 2006-09-03 2006-09-03 2009-06-03 Author is listed
  18. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (2) 2006-09-03 2008-03-08

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Baltimore Greek Week 2012 Begins


The Baltimore-Piraeus Sister City Committee is celebrating Greek cultural heritage and special cuisine with the 2nd Baltimore Greek Week commencing on Sunday, March 18, and culminating on March 25, with a parade in Greektown commemorating Greece’s National Independence Day (2pm to 4pm.).

This year’s Greek Week will pay tribute to the Mediterranean flavors and diet with many restaurants in the area having special prices on traditional Greek meals and sweets during the Week.

Other events organized for the week include

  • the “Young Greek Artists, Art and Photography” exhibition to be hosted at the Baltimore Gallery, with a cocktail reception taking place on Monday, March 19, at 6pm.
  • a lecture on the benefits of the Mediterranean diet at Captain James Landing on Thursday, March 23 at 7:00 p.m. in order to discuss the health benefits of the Mediterranean diet and Greek wine.
  • The free screening of Greek-American movies like Zorba the Greek, 300, Troy, My Big Fat Greek Wedding, Never on Sunday, hosted at Hazelwood Inn

For more events, please visit http://www.baltimoregreece.org/baltimore-greek-week2012a.shtml

The Baltimore-Piraeus Sister City Committee was founded in 1982 to promote cultural and business exchanges between the port cities of Baltimore, USA and Piraeus, Greece. As the event organizer, The Baltimore-Piraeus Sister City Committee is simply looking to promote awareness of the Greek-American committee. It hosts a number of Greek cultural and educational events throughout the Baltimore area, which have contributed to raising money for such causes as: Cooley’s Anemia research at Johns Hopkins, the restoration of The Liberty Ship S.S. John W. Brown, and the Ancient Collection of The Walters Art Museum.

Simple solution for Greece: Adopt the dollar !!!!!

dolars

















LONDON (MarketWatch) — The story that Iceland might ditch the krona and adopt the Canadian dollar instead was one of the more intriguing news items of last week. But it didn’t seem to have much support. The sensible Canadians, who came through the credit crunch with hardly a scratch, quickly decided they didn’t want to take on responsibility for Iceland’s financial “innovators,” even if they might be more chastened these days than they were for most of the last decade.
There is, however, a dramatic currency switch that might just work: Greece ditching the euro EURUSD -0.42% , and adopting the dollar instead.
Crazy? Not completely. In fact, it might well be one of the few viable ways to get Greece out of its current mess. And if President Barack Obama could pull a plan to save Greece, and with it a fragile global economy, out of the hat in the autumn it wouldn’t exactly hurt his chances of re-election.
Despite a temporary stay-of-execution with its latest debt restructuring, Greece is no more fixed than it has ever been.

True, no less a person than French President Nicolas Sarkozy has assured us that with the latest debt restructuring the crisis is over and we can all start worrying about something else. But of course it isn’t fixed at all. Greece is still in a deep economic hole. Its economy may shrink by another 6% this year. Youth unemployment is now above 50%. There is zero sign of stability let alone growth, which means the debt burden keeps rising. Elections are on the horizon, which could well see extremists come to power. If the new government starts to renegotiate the terms of the bailout package, as it might well, the whole thing could unravel and everyone would be back to square one.

Meanwhile, the Greek economy continues to slip into an abyss. The latest bailout deal salvages some money for the banks but does nothing for Greece itself. As part of a fresh round of austerity measures demanded by its euro-zone partners, the government is pushing through cuts in government salaries and in the minimum wage. As people’s pay goes down, they going to spend less money, more businesses will go broke, and unemployment will keep rising. In reality, Greece is being forced to double-up on the same austerity, zero-growth policies that got it into this mess in the first place. It seems precisely nothing has been learned from the last two years.
But actually there is a simple solution that few people have yet considered. I am indebted to Georgios Gialtouridis for making the suggestion to me. Greece could simply swap the euro for another big global currency — the dollar.
Once you start to think about it, it makes a certain sense.
It is very hard for Greece to pull out of the euro unilaterally. This is a country that runs a substantial trade deficit, and no longer has any realistic ability to borrow money. If it introduced a new drachma overnight, it would collapse in value. For a while it might be quite literally worthless, in the way the Zimbabwean currency was. No one would want to accept it. It can’t hope to pay for its imports. In extremis, it might not be able to pay for oil and medicines. Indeed, there are already reports that oil traders are reluctant to sell to Greece. If they were offered drachmas they certainly wouldn’t.
The risk is that the nation would collapse. Indeed, the fear of that may now be all that is keeping the Greeks in the single currency. But imagine if it simply switched to the dollar. Overnight, all Greek euro contracts would be re-denominated in dollars at a rate of one to one.
That would have two big advantages.
The dollar trades at about 30% less than the euro, so Greece would have devalued by 30% at a stroke — which, luckily enough, is roughly what it needs to do to restore competitiveness.
Yet at the same time, it would have a hard currency. No one selling things to Greece would mind being paid in dollars. It is acceptable everywhere.
Of course, the Federal Reserve would have to be willing to extend liquidity to Greek banks. But it has done that for foreign banks in the past. Indeed, it already swaps dollars with the European Central Bank. And there has been talk of the Fed buying up peripheral country debt to stop the euro collapsing. So there is nothing to stop it supporting Greece — and it is not as if the Fed is exactly averse to printing a bit more money.
Over time, Greece might go back to the drachma. It could push through more structural reforms, reap the rewards of its devaluation, and, as its economy started to recover, it could start planning to introduce its own currency. And it could do so from a position of strength, not weakness.
Or if it found it wanted to be part of a larger currency zone, it could just stay with the dollar. Maybe it would have trouble keeping up with the U.S. — but probably not as much trouble as it had keeping up with Germany.
What’s in it for the U.S.? Simple. Stability. Greece is a strategically important country. The Truman Doctrine of 1947, which laid the basis for the Marshall Plan, and the Cold War policy of containment, was specifically aimed at stopping Communist expansion in Greece and Turkey.
The U.S. has just as much of a stake in a stable Greece in 2012 as it did in 1947. On top of that, it would be neat riposte to anyone who suggests the dollar is in long-term decline: it would stop any talk about the euro replacing the dollar for a very, very long time. And the 3 million Americans who claim to be of Greek descent would be pleased as well. Indeed, for President Obama, saving Greece by letting it switch to the dollar might be the perfect surprise to pull off going into an election.


Matthew Lynn
Matthew Lynn is chief executive of Strategy Economics, a London-based consultancy. His latest book, ‘The Long Depression: The Slump of 2008 to 2031,’ is published by Endeavour Press.

American Hellenic Institute Honors Tom Chris Korologos of Utah and 4 others as Most Outstanding Diaspora Greeks

From the left: AHI Awards 2012 recipients Korologos, Elliott, Tsongas, Vahaviolos, Antholis

The American Hellenic Institute (AHI) celebrated its 37th Anniversary Hellenic Heritage Achievement And National Public Service Awards over a splendid dinner last Saturday at the Capital Hilton in Washington.

During the event five outstanding Greek-Americans were presented with the awards:

  • Kary Antholis, the President of Home Box Office Miniseries, which is responsible for the development and production of entertaining TV series in the worldwide famous HBO channel
  • E.J. “Mike” Eliiott, successful industrialist of Cretan descent and chairman of Gencor Industries Inc.
  • Representative Niki Tsongas in the Fifth Congressional District of Massachusetts
  • Sotirios J. Vahaviolos, PhD, founder, chairman and CEO of MISTRAS Group Inc., who is a well known supporter of environmental security measures applied to major industrial and public works and projects around the world.
  • Tom C. Korologos, adviser of the DLA Piper law firm and former US Ambassador to Belgium

The program of the event was presented by the economic editor of the TC channel CBS, Alexis Christoforous, while the awards were presented to the honorees by the President of the American Hellenic Institute Foundation, Spiro Spireas, PhD, and the President and CEO of the American Hellenic Institute, Nick Larigakis, in the presence of the founder of the Institute, Eugene Rossides, and the prominent lawyer and high ranking member of the Board of Directors of the Institute, Nicholas G. Karambelas.

Other prominent figures attending the awards dinner included the Greek Ambassador to the USA, Vassilis Kaskarelis, the Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the USA, Paul Anastasiadis, the US coordinator and President of the Council of Hellenes Abroad, Theodoros Spyropoulos, the President of the Hellenic American National Council, Paul Kotrotsios.

Tom C. Korologos


United States Ambassador to Belgium
In office
July 14, 2004 – 2007
President George W. Bush
Preceded by Stephen Brauer
Succeeded by Sam Fox
Personal details
Born April 6, 1933 (age 78)
Salt Lake City, Utah
Profession Lobbyist

Tom Chris Korologos, (born April 6, 1933 in Salt Lake City, Utah), is a past United States Ambassador to Belgium.

Early life, education, and early career

A second generation Greek American, Tom has family origins from Tyros, Arcadia, and Greece. His parents Chris T. Korologos and Irene M. Kolendrianos, are both immigrants from Arcadia, in the Peloponnese region. His father was a bartender in Utah.

Korologos started out as a journalist with The Salt Lake Tribune. Later he worked for the New York Herald Tribune, theLong Island Press, and the Associated Press. He was a U.S. Air Force officer from 1956 to 1957. He earned his B.A. degree at the University of Utah in 1956, and a M.S. degree from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism in 1958 where he received the Grantland Rice Fellowship and a Pulitzer Traveling Fellowship.

Political career

From 1962 to 1971 he worked for U.S. Senator Wallace F. Bennett of Utah. He served in the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford presidential administrations from 1971 to 1975, and has worked closely with Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush. He was co-founder of Timmons & Company, a Washington, DC consulting firm. He has been involved in more than 300 U.S. Senate confirmations including assisting Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President Gerald Ford, Supreme Court Justices: William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and nominee Robert Bork, as well as several cabinet secretaries, including: Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, and Donald Rumsfeld.

Korologos has had a wide and varied Washington, D.C. experience. He has served as a senior staff member in the U.S. Congress, as an assistant to two Presidents in the White House, was a prominent businessman, and most recently was a senior counselor with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad. In addition, he was a long-time member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and a charter member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors that has jurisdiction over all non-military U.S. Government radio and TV broadcasting overseas. He currently is strategic advisor at DLA Piper in Washington, D.C.

Non-profit board memberships

Personal life

Korologos was married to Joy G. Korologos, the couple had three children, Paula, Ann and Philip. Paula Lisbe, one of their daughters, is an actress. Joy died from melanoma in 1997. Tom re-married, to Ann McLaughlin Korologos, who was United States Secretary of Labor in the [[Ronald Reagan] administration who serves on the boards of several major companies. Tom is an avid, and professional photographer who is represented by the Ann Korologos Gallery in Basalt, Colorado.

See also

External links


«One million signatures for Europe»

PURPOSE

The collection of one (1) million signatures in electronic format. The signatures should cover as many regions of Europe as possible on the basis of geography and population. The text bearing the signatures will then be sent to the President of the European Commission.

THE MEANING OF SIGNATURES

Signing the petition will indicate OPPOSITION to poverty and to individual and national subjugation. European Solidarity: this is a huge duty and responsibility for all of us.

WE DEMAND:

The REMOVAL of the onerous Debt. When countries are in “a state of necessity’‘ (when they are experiencing the collapse of their health and education systems, as well as their wages and pensions), repayment of the burdensome debt must be put aside. The necessity for survival and human dignity must come before repayment of a debt.

NOTE: under Article 8 of the Treaty of Lisbon, about one (1) million signatures will be officially put into force on 1/4/2012. From that point onwards, European citizens will be able to make their requests for the passing of Laws in the European Union.

There is a NEED: by that date, SEISACHTHEIA must have collected the signatures of one (1) million European citizens in order to claim and establish the validity of the state of necessity. (When the people are suffering, the usurer cannot be paid).

ONE MILLION SIGNATURES FOR “A EUROPE OF SOLIDARITY”

To: Mr José Manuel Barroso,
President of the European Commission
1049 Brussels, Belgium.

Mr President,
I. It is hard to accept that Europe has established a usurious relationship with Greece (and other countries). The rate of interest of the loans which Troïka have lent to Greece is much more than those rates at which the State creditors borrow. (Germany borrows at a 0,25% rate of interest and afterwards lends to Greece at 5%.) The financial crisis in Greece has been taken advantage of by Member States, who gain inadmissible enrichment at Greece’s expense. And that meets with the total denial of communal solidarity. Such economic cannibalism against a Member State constitutes the highest risk for the values of Europe.

II. The solutions that are given are NOT viable for Greece – and moreover, not generally viable for the European financial structure as a whole. The loans to Greece, at a destructive rate of interest, create a higher debt; as well as the misconduct of every smooth public functioning of the institutions within the Eurozone. The situation REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ACTION.

III. We invite you, under Article 8 of the Lisbon Treaty, to introduce to the European Commission the following resolutions, for adoption:

Write off every part unilaterally: in particular, the part of the public debt, which falls under the category of the “odious debt”, such as the “Greek” debt. Most of the debt consists of the capitalization of the interest, which goes back many decades. The capital of the loans themselves has been paid. In other words, write off this COMPOUND INTEREST.

Establish the Principle of the “state of necessity ”. When the financial and the political existence of a State is in danger because of the serving of the abhorrent debt (galloping unemployment; the collapse of wages and pensions; the closure of hospitals and schools, as well as of social services; individual wretchedness; etc.) the refusal of its payment is necessary and justifiable.

Sign The Petition Here: www.1millionsignatures.eu